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Senate 
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 1975 
ENERGY LEGISLATION 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on 
Friday last, on my own tntt1at1ve, I re-
quested a meettng wtth the President of 
the United states to discuss energy legis-
lation and the approaching September 1 
deadline, at which time decontrols and 
allocations would automatically expire. 
A13 I say, I went down there 1n my own 
capacity, on my own 1n1tiative. A13 a re-
sult of the conversations I had with the 
President, I informed him that It was my 
intention to call a conference of the 
Democratic Senators on either Wednes-
day or Thursday to discuss his sugges-
tions and my conversation. That meeting 
will be held at noon tomorrow, at which 
time I will make a full report to the 
Democrats assembled, and whatever ac-
tion will be taken at that time will be 
taken by the Democrats 1n conference 
assembled. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that I may have printed 1n the 
RECORD at this time a statement I made 
on the price of gasoline and what I pro-
posed, dated July 22, 1975; also, a letter 
to the President dated August 1, 1975; a 
letter to the President dated August 29, 
1975; a paper on the' Energy Allocation 
Act and why It should be extended; a 
paper entitled "The National Interest 
Would Best Be Served by Extending the 
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act"; 
and also a paper entitled "Settling the 
Oil Price Issue With a Program of Grad-
ual Decontrol Is Possible," stating that It 
would be enacted in 30 days under certain 
circumstances. All the material from 
August 29, 1975, has been sent to every 
Senator in this body, both Republican 
and Democrat, including our newest 
Member <Mr. COTTON), and also to the 
House leadership, so that everybody will 
be aware of what I was attempting to do 
on my own Initiative and be Informed 
thereby. 
There being no objection, the material 
was ordered to be printed In the RECORD, 
as follows: 
STATEMENT 01' SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD, 
JULY 2!1, 1975 
There Is no questloa but that the price of 
gasoline Is going to Increase, no matter which 
way we turn. The President bas proposed a 
gTadual decontrol of prices on oil produced 
in tbla country trom fields that were In 
operation In 1973, that Ia "old" oil. The price 
of that oil Is t5.26 per barrel, while the "new .. 
oll produced sells for roughly •13.60 a barrel, 
the same, 1n effect, as imported foreign oil. 
There are no price controlS on crude oil pro-
duced from new fields, from small stripper 
wells In old fields, or on above-1972 produc-
tion levels for old wells. 
There Is llttle or no Incentive tor owners of 
wellS whlcb produce an average o! 16-20 bar-
rels a day to keep on producing under pres-
ent circumstances. They could let their pro-
duction decline below ten barrelS dally so 
that they could quality for the free-market 
stripper-well prices and, as a result, could · 
make more money from producing less oU. 
They wlll not lnV11St in secondary or tert11U'f 
recovery methods becaUBe they' could not af-
ford to do so whU& tbey receive f5.26 per 
barrel. 
The existing controlS expire on August 81. 
If they do, there wm be a very abrupt ln• 
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crease In prices which will tend to halt the 
economic recovery which now_seems to be 
In progress and turn It Into a backward slide. 
The President has ·proposed a plan to grad-
ually ll!t controls on a month by month ba.sls 
over a thirty-month period. Federal Energy 
Administrator Zarb estimates that prices 
would Increase by 1 '/2 cents per gallon by the 
end o! tills year, by 2 \l.z cents more in 1976 
and by 3 cen.ts more In 1977, !or a total in-
crease of 'I cents a gallon. This,ln my opinion, 
is an undec-estlmtttlon of the price riees which 
would W1rJ l&el:V occur. 
1 would ~ :tba.t, Instead a! decontrols 
being phe.aedcnlt G>VM a thirty-month period, 
.t.&at serious cmm14er&tlon should be given 
to phase tlll.em out over a 4-6 year period. The' 
President a.lso .should put an end to the $2 
a barrel tax on Imported oil. An excess profits 
tax Shottld appl:y m>t just on producers of 
deoontrolled ~ll. but on profits from new oil 
as well. 
It appears t.o me that there Is room !or 
compramtse ~n the Congressional and 
the Adm.M1u.t.r&tlan poin.t.ll o! view. If some-
thing Is not dame and this deadlock Is al-
lowed to continue. the people will suffer more 
and more. "The on produced wll1 be less and 
lesa and the conseque=es, based on the effect 
this would have throughout the economy, 
would be cns.trous. The President ca.nnot 
-and Illll&t not &llow a.11 controls to expire Oil 
A~gust 81. The deadlock which now exists 
·must be broken ~ J).erha.ps some o! the 
suggestions I ha.ve made could be used a.s 
the basis !or a compromise which would ben-
efit the people of the nation and the economy .. 
It we can:r~ot, as repreeentr.tlves of the two 
bra.nches of government, work io:wards such 
a p0681tl111ty !or the common good, then W'hat 
I ha.ve said at tbe beginning would still hold, 
except that tbe "rippling" economic results 
would be cat&atroph1c. 
No matter what we do, it 1s going to call 
tor Increased costs. Wba.t we ought to en-
deavor to do Is to handle these Increased 
oosts on a prolonged ba.sis so that the eco-
nomic effect will be minimal. I repeat, no 
matter which way we turn, the cost o! oil 
ts going to tnerea.se. There Ia no way to avoid 
tbJII and with that foot in mlncl, the <Jongre~~~~ 
a.lld :tbe Pt'esldent have a. duty to get together 
to wnrk out an a,greement which will be 
best· for the na tlon. 
OFnc!: ar nn: MA.roRtTY L~<ADtt, 
WIIShit&gton, D.C., A11g11st 1, 1975. 
THE PRESIDENT 
TJte JVIt-tte llrnue, 
Washington, D.C. 
DEAR Mil. PRESIDENT: As we enter the st&t.u-
tory August adjournment, an assessment of 
natlona.l energy policy Is essentt.a.l. During 
the pnst six (6) months, the federal govern-
ment has a'btlempted te ~ome 40 years of 
1nattentloa by g~ ~ highest pi'Iorlty to 
the development or a national energy policy. 
"You have Pf'Ov\ded grea.t focus and stimulus 
to these efforts. I personally have never wit-
nessed a more intensive undertaldng by any 
Congress and I beHeve these efforts by so 
many have been most productive. However, 
there remain eertam a.speets of the compre-
hensive program t1l.a.t have yet to be resolved. 
Among these are prlclng aspects with regard 
to domestic on. I bel.leve, however, that even 
this dUI'Icult determination will soon be 
achieved. This Is particularly so 1n view o! 
tm fact that on 110 ma!ly energy policy Issues 
there has been substantial cooperation an4 
acoord between tbe Congress and the Admin-
istration. 
We ha7l.e a.ll become more informed on the 
de.ta.lls at the .energy pr.oblem .and especla.lly 
an. ho:w emergy .declsions precJ,plta.te economic 
oonsequelllleS . .r. m}Uiel!. ha.ve advocated a 
policy Ql ~ual remova.l or controls and 
I believe the development of such a ,poilcy 
wm e:v.ol¥11 JIB tiLe Leglalatille process Is per-
wttte4 to wDtlt lt.s wm. Over what period and 
to what price are questions tha.t can be an-
swered In a legislative forum. · 
As you know, In the last seveu.l days, many 
o! us here 1.n 13l.e Con,gres~> haft been meet-
Ing with Mr. GnleRSJIIIUl, Mr. Zarb and others 
within the Ac1Inlm5trablan to the end that 
a mutually agreeable solution along these 
lines wou\d eme:r:ge. Ncy 1mpre861on Is that 
we have come close--very close--to arriving 
at a sa.tlstactory a.nawer; one that a.ll sides 
could live with and one that would demon-
strate to the American people that their gov-
ernment--both branches, both houses of 
Congress and botQ. parties-Is working In 
harmony to resolve this most difficult Issue. 
As close as we have come, however, time cUd 
not permit the solution to emerge. As a re-
sult, we are left In an extraordinary poslt)on. 
Without restraint, oil price Increases could 
seriously damage the economy at a time when 
110me hopeful signs .are beg1nnlng to develop 
In oerta.ln sectors. WIUlout restra.lnt, oil price 
increaselil would provide profit .rewards of In-
ordinate and unconscionable dimensions and 
at the cruel expense o! those of our cl tlzens 
least able to afford enormous price Increases. 
No slngle eco1>0mlst, In or out o! govern-
;meu.t, welcomes the all•at..once spectre of 
!11DMS1lra:lned oU prices with unrestrained lm-
pa.ct .on ~e .A.m.er.lca.n consumer. That the 
ftna.l details of an :ag1·eeahle prlctng formula. 
have not been worked out, however, does not 
mean that, at le6St !or the interim, we should 
not seek together to prevent what all agree 
would be the dlsa.stero'tls consequences 
brought on by the full econam.lc Impact o! 
abrupt decontrol and no restraining or miti-
gating levers at a.ll, be they aimed at equl-
tallle allocatJ.ODII, prices or prof! ts or offset-
ting rebates. I! allowed to ha.ppen, In my 
.Judgment, the damage occasioned would not 
and could not be rec'tltled. 
To avoid such sn occurrence Is the reason 
I write this letter. It Is to provide you with 
my thoughts Dn thla laaue which 1 view with 
the greatest Oegnee D! concern. It Is to &d. vise 
you that 1n ·~ ,tuctgment ltbe opportunity 
exlsta to enact a. sens!hle G>U prloe policy; one 
perhaps that will not give all sides every-
thing they seek, but one Which does not leave 
the Nation wtth the won>t of a.ll possible 
worlds--as Is the lllltuatlon we face If the 
Emergency Allocation Act Is not extended. In 
my judgment, an extension of tbe Allocation 
Act would avoid for the Nation the "worst 
~~ali" options. I am conftc1ent that you wlll 
provide <the leadersh.V> that will permit the 
constructive process o! the pa.st six months 
to continue. · 
'Sincerely, 
MntJ< MANSFU:LD. 
P.S.-I bel!Jlve the .added time will permit 
the completion or a truly natlona.l policy on 
energy w0t'kec1 out be'tween the branches. We 
he.ve oome a long way s1noe January, both on 
-enel!gY and .eoonomk ncovery. 
OFFICE OJI' TED: MA.roarrY LEADJ!:Il, 
Washington, D.C., August 29, 1975. 
THE Plu:sm~<NT, 
The White House, 
Washington, D.O. 
DEAR MR. Plti!!&IBEI'n: On A'tlgust 1, I wrote 
you expreeeln& me persona.! view that the 
national lntereat could best be served at this 
time by an extemilon of oil prlce restraints 
beyond the ~at month. Since that time 
l have had sn oppol'tunlty to consider the 
matter further .&ncl a.m e:v.en more firml5' 
convinced of the Impending perl,l to the econ-
omy posed by unrestre.in.ed across-the-boe.rd 
prlce Increases tn petroleum products. I am 
convinced as well that I! -given a little time 
the Executive and Leglsl&Uve Branchee can 
come to terms with a solution to the energy 
price prclblem ~ble to all sides. 
It liB Jar t.bese U'8.Stl1lA that I -again wrt te 
you to tl:le -.11 that the Nation .might avctd 
the ex.traord.I.Jluy posl.tlon .now taoed. Nel-
ther the Administration nor the Congrc cs 
seek abrupt and total decontrol. Together. 
both Branches and both parties have workc:i 
diligently to produce a solution to the enert~Y 
pricing Issue. I am frank to say that It bas 
been your effort that .bas provided the pri-
mary Impetus to the energy Issue and t.o the 
need to develop a comprehensive energy poi-
ley for the Nation. Been usc o! your effort, 
much bns been done to shape and Imple-
ment such a pdllcy; more, In tact, In the 
past six months than -ever before In the No-
tion's history. Before the August adjourn-
ment It wa.s clear that we had come close 
to resolving the only major energy Issue re-
maining to be resolved-the question of pha'-
ing out price controls In the most orderly 
and non-dlsrupt.lve manner possible. 
On July 16, the Senate passed S-1849, the 
Emergency f'etrqJ.eum Allocation EKtenslon 
Act o! 1975, by a vote of 62 to 29 with eight 
Senators not voting. On July Sl, the House 
o! Representatives paszed the Senate bill by 
.a. vote o! 303 to 117 with 14 not voting. Thus. 
the Congress has overwhelmingly expre•sed 
its view with regard flo the pressing need for 
an extension o! the Act !or a 6-month period. 
Tb.., issue now centers on whether or not 
there w1ll be a veto of the Act when It Is 
fPl'esen.ted for your signature, which brings 
me directly to the point o! major concern . 
What I suggest Is that simply because tlle 
tina! detnlls of an agreeable pricing policy 
have not emerged, the Nation should not be 
m&de to sufft'r the consequences o! no pric-
Ing policy a.t all as Is the ca.se with totnl 
decontrol, nor sho\\Jd the efforts' to work out 
the final details of such a policy be aban-
doned. 
I am frank to say that I do not know what 
wlll happen come Labor Day with winter 
close behind, when, barring an extension, all 
controls will end. There are as many views 
on this mntter as there are "experts." What 
further confuses the picture is the !act that 
no one knows what will happen when the 
OPEC cartel meets three weeks !rom now t.o 
discuss :t=ther price Increases. What Is clear 
to me, however, In spite o! the lfs, ands and 
buts, Is that the consumer will be hurt come 
September I! controls &re not eK.tended, that 
the price o! petroleum and an or Its by-prod-
ucts will go up. thnt the prices of otlher en-
ergy sources will go up, that Inflation wUl 
be rekindled throughout the economy, that 
the burden o! all of this wm be borne most 
by those In our society who can least afford 
lt, that the tllckers of economic recovery now 
Indicated could well be snuffed out and U1at 
we might expect n r eturn to double-digit ln-
:l'latlon, clo~e to double-digit tmemployment 
and a much gren1Rr budget deficit thl\n al-
l'Mdy projected. What Is also compelling In 
1th811e d.rcumsta.nces ~a ttlat there &1'e abso-
latel:y no measures on the books that woult! 
serve to mitigate the adver~e Impact o! total 
decontrol , be they In the form o! w1nd!all 
profits taxes, tax rebates to particularly llnrd-
pressed consumers or protection for ~mall. 
Independent producers who might otherwise 
be driven out o! the marketplace. 
In short, the potentia.! perils poeed bv 
abrupt and total deco'ntrol are c.le&r enough 
to me t.o urge that we In the Congress be 
permitted to continue to explore with the 
Executive the possibility o! a more orderly 
and less disrupt! ve approach to the prlcl '>g 
Issue. That we have oome close to agreement 
already Is encouraging. For the sake o! the 
Nation, I hope we are allowed to continue 
these negotlatllons. To them and to their 
success I stand firmly committed. · 
Respectfully, 
MIKE MANSFIELD . 
TH1!: ENERCY .ALLOCATION ACT !::HOULD BE 
'EXTENDED 
1. The Congress a.nd the .Aod'mlnlstrAtion 
can pr.oduce a reasonable sol.uUon to the 
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oil price question which Includes an orderly 
phase-out of controls and far less disruption 
to the economy than would occur from total 
and abrupt decontrol. 
2. Total decontrol with the ripple etrect 
means a return to double-digit Inflation 
with higher costs for food. gasoline. clothing, 
air transportation, medical costs, home heat-
ing oil, etc.. 
3. Total decontrol means a return to 9 
percent unemployment and, very likely, 
double digits. 
4. Total decontrol means a budget deficit 
even larger than now projected. 
6. Total decontrol falls hardest on the 
poor, the unemployed-those least able to 
bear the burden. 
6. There are no mitigating measures; no 
wt.nd!all profits taxes; no tax cuts or rebates; 
nnd no competitive protections for small, In-
dependent producers who will be driven out 
of the market. 
7. OPEC Intends to raise prices-It meets 
September 23-thus creating even grea~cr 
disruption to the economy. 
THE NATIONAL IN"TR<'ST WOULD BEST BE 
SERVED BT ErTnmiNG 'THJ: EMERGENCY 
PETIIOLJroM ALLocATION Ac:r 
I . Virtuallv all !'"pnomi•ts Pp-ree that It the 
Petroleum Allocation Act Is not extended, 
It me~ chaoe and disruption to the econ-
omY.. 
(a) Even without the $2 per barrel tarltf 
on Imported oil, oil decontrol will directly 
Inflate oil prices by •IS billion annually. 
(b) The multiplier and ripple effe~t could 
cause between $20 and .. so billion in Infla-
tionary Impact on the economy. 
(c) The stimulus o! the tax cut would be 
wiped out. 
(d) It will drain consumer spending power 
!or all other goods and services and will 
badly hurt economic recovery. 
As Examples: The coats o! propane, of 
fertilizer.•. or air tra-•"ortattnn, or auto 
transportation, ot synthetic fibers will all 
increase. . 
2. OPEC Is scheduled to meet ~eptember 2S 
to discuss Increases. 
(a) A $1.50 per barrel OPEC Increase will 
add another ell to $10 billion annually to 
Inflation-further increasing the costs of 
all goods and servloee dependent upon 
petroleum and Its by-products. 
(b) Domestic decontrol o! oil prices sig-
nals OPEC that high prices are o.k. Decon-
troll!ng domestic prices and removal of the 
tariff provides OPEO with an opportunity to 
Increase their prices by •2 and claim they 
are not lncreasl- 1!' the total price for the 
United States consumers. 
(c) In the absence of domestic controls, 
any tncrease posted by OPEO may be quickly 
followed by Increases In domestic prices as 
well. Veto of the Petroleum Allocation Act 
removes the FEA's authority to establish 
domestic oil prices and ell'ectlvely substi-
tutes OPEO price control over domestic 
energy. 
(d) Steeply higher petroleum prices w!U 
reduce the demand for all other goods and 
services. As a consequence, the Impact on 
employment has been estimated to be a toes 
of up to 500,000 Jobs. The transportation 
Industry, food producers, medical services, 
universities that can't pass on coets, and 
many other eecton w1ll be especially hard 
hit. . 
8. Winter 1s approaching. The lees ot pe-
troleum all0011otlon authority w111 severely 
Impact the nation thh winter. 
(a) With the erptratton or allocation au-
thority, control8 over propane wm lapse. 
Propane prloea to farmers and rural real· 
dents will steeply rise and euppllee of pro-
pane wW be very tight to household oon-
eumera. Without allocatton, utU1ttee and 
large Industrial users that are experiencing 
natural gas curtaUments will monopolize 
available supplies. 
(b) With projected shortages of natural 
gas, It Is Imperative to have a petroleum 
allocation program tn place to assure that 
alternative fuel supplies are made available 
to curtailed gas customers. This will help 
minimize the number of plant clos~nga due 
to fuel shortages. 
(c) The availability of oil products to 
sparsely settled sections or the country w111 
be endangered tn the absence of a manda· 
tory petroleum allocation program. 
(d) .tn the event or a severe wtnter, or In 
case or a !uture oil embargo, It Is essential 
that the machinery for allocating petroleum 
products be continually In place. 
· 4. There are no measures on the books that 
would mitigate the adverse Impact of total/ 
a.o • .J.pi decontrol. 
(a) Congress has not passed wind! all profits 
taxes. 
(b) Congress has not passed further tax 
cuts to alleviate the consumer's burden. 
(c) There are no pro~ctlons for small tn· 
dependent produoem. 
5. The terznlnatlon or the Emergency Petro-
leum Allocation Act threatens to severely 
reduce competition .tn the petroleum tndus-
try. 
(a) Elimination or controls will mean that 
many Independent refiners will be squeezed 
out of business because major Integrated pe-
troleum companies will have access to much 
lower cost crude oil. The old on will not go 
up In cost to the Integrated producer, but 
only to the tndependent purchasers. 
(b) Ellmtnatlon of controls will mean the 
Independent service station operators will be 
turther squeezed out of .bus.ness because ot 
tho cost an,si supply advantages that will 
accrue to the major Integrated petroleum 
companies. 
6. There Is already evidence of the damage 
to the economy of decontrol. 
(a) Many petroleum companies have al· 
ready substantially Increased their prices In 
recent months by passtng through costs. 
(b) This has created much greater public 
hostility to even further price Increases. 
(c) The moet recent reports on tnflatton 
Indicate that rood and fuel prices are again 
causing rapid tn1iatlon throughout the 
economy. To prevent this cycle from getting 
out of hand, If<. Is Imperative that oU ptlcee 
be controlled. 
(d) Even the petroleum Industry no longer 
speaks with one voloe. The MobU Oil Corpo-
ration, In a letter to the members ot the 
Senate dated August ~2. 1976, calla for phased 
decontrol of oil pr1cea over an extended 
period ot time and tndlcates that Immediate 
decontrol as would occur with the expiration 
o! the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act 
"might cause a shock to America's fragile 
economlo recovery." 
(e) Arthur Burns has Indicated that oU 
price decontrol may reeult In a ~-percent tn-
crease tn tn1lat1on, substantially more than 
the Admtn1strat1on'a eetlmate. All or these 
factors may shift the balance tn favor ot 
overriding tbe President's veto. 
7. A veto will hurt the chances for enaotlng 
a national energy program. A vato at thle time 
means a total co=ttment to llky-hlgh prices 
by the President. Signing tbe bUI prondes 
the oppmunlty tor the compromise ~simply 
because It Is only a llix-month extenaton). 
The House 1s currently POnsldertng H.R. 70J4, 
which I.e scheduled to be completed on an 
urgent b6sls. To that measure can be added 
the product ot any compromise workect out 
between the Oongreee and the Admtnlatra• 
tlon. 
SETTI.ING TJD On. ~ I&8uJ: , W'rr11 A J'lto-
GilAK a. GUDUAL Illlo!urnloL Ill ~ 
IT OoULD Bw ENAOnD 'WlTBnf 118 DU'B . 
I. Only a 1hort time Ill needed tQ settae the 
decontrol is&ue. 
The House voted 228 to 189 on the Presl· 
dent's proposal to phase out controls over a 
39-month. period. A needed switch ot 20 
members Indicates that the two branohee are 
coining closer to settling the oU price Issue. 
In the national tnterest this ell'ort must be 
continued to avoid the economic disruption 
of total and abrupt decontrol and to p~;event 
the OPEC cartel from setting oil price policy 
tor the nation. A phase-out over what pe· 
rlod o! time and to what price lid are Issues 
that can be resolved. 
It Is reasonable to propose that the matter 
can be settled within SO days. But time Is 
needed. 
If signed Into law and not vetoed, S. 1849 
would provide the time. It would extend 
current controls for six months. Six months 
may be too long. But the two Houses could 
act on a measure for an orderly, less-dlsrup· 
tlve phase-out well within the next 30 days. 
When It returns on Wednesday, the House 
will have under consideration H.R. 7014, the 
energy bill to which a phase-out program 
could be added. For Its part, the Senate could 
consider a phase-out proposal well within 
the next SO days and the Leadership Is w11l-
lng to co=it the Senate to that under-
taktng. 
The alternative of veto (unless overrld· 
den) provides no time for cooperation and 
compromise. This alternative moves the na-
tion tnto total and abrupt decontrol on 
Labor Day. OPEC meets In three weeks aJI.d 
oil prices then and thereafter would be 
dictated by the OPEC cartel. In SO days, Oon· 
grees and the Executive together can IM!ttle 
on an oil price pollcf for American con-
sumers. The veto alternative would veet the 
OPEC cartel with this power. 
IT. Time Is needed to act on other essen-
tial measures related to decontrol. 
Gradual decontrol Is pa.rt or a comprehen-
sive program requiring other legislative ac-
tion. Tl.me Is required to enact these pro-
poeals needed to oll'set the adversity ot de· 
control. 
Only I! S. 1849 Is not vetoed would Con-
gress have the time-the opportunity to en-
act other essential elements of the Presi-
dent's program which complement decontrol 
and provide protection tor consumers and 
the economy. 
These Include windfall proftte ta:ree, tax 
rebates/cuts and the preservation of com-
petition (protection tor small, Independent 
producers !rom predatory praotlcee by large 
companies). 
None of these measures are now on the 
books. They too could be considered and dis· 
posed of wlthtn SO days. 
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